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CURRENT DECISIONS
ADMINISTRATIvE LAw-FDERAL IMMUNITY FROM SUIT--STATUTORY WAIVER.-
The detective force of a railroad under federal administration procured the arrest
of a party suspected of stealing from a wreck. Its suspicions were unfounded and
the accused was discharged. He then brought suit against the Director General
of railroads for false imprisonment under the Federal Control Act, Act of
March 21, I918 (40 Stat. at L. 456) which subjected the federal government to
the liabilities of a common carrier. The lower court gave judgment for the plain-
tiff. Held, that the judgment be affirmed. Director General v. Kastenbaum
(1923) 44 Sup. Ct. 52.
The federal government, in its sovereign capacity, cannot be sued in tort
without consent. Belknap v. Schild (1896) 161 U. S. IO, 16 Sup. Ct 443; Moon
v. Hines (Ig2I) 2o5 Ala. 355, 87 So. 6o3. Such consent, given by a government
when undertaking a private enterprise as in the instant case, is generally
commended. Maguire, State Liability for Tort (igi6) 3o HARv. L. REV. 2o;
Actions Against Railroads under Federal Control (1919) 23 LAW NOTES, 5; see
COMMENTS (1922) 31 YALE: LAW JOURNAL, 879; (1924) 33 ibid. 432.
DAMAGES-CONTRACTS-FLUCTUATING ExcHANGE.-In a suit by a citizen to
recover a debt owed by a German on an account stated payable in marks, the sole
question was whether the decree should be for the value in dollars of the marks
at the time of the breach, or for their value at the date of the decree. Held, that
the proper exchange was at the time of the breach. Guinness v. Miller (1923,
S. D. N. Y.) 291 Fed. 769.
Although the courts in this country are in conflict, the better view seems in
accord with the instant case. See COMMENTS (1921) 31 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 198;
(1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 422; Gluck, Rate of Exchange in Law of Damages
(1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 217. England has definitely adopted the "breach day"
rule. Di Ferdinando v. Simon [1920, C. A.] 3 K. B. 4o9.
EQUITY-EXECUTORY CONTRACT FOR SALE OF LAND-EFFECT OF TENANT
HOLDING OVER UNDER EMERGENCY RENT LAws.-The defendant contracted in
writing to sell to the plaintiff a dwelling house in New York City, the contract
containing a clause that "rents if any are to be apportioned." The house was then
in possession of tenants, and due to the Emergency Rent Law the defendant was
unable to eject them. The law was in force at the time the contract was made.
The plaintiff refused to accept a conveyance while the tenants were in possession
and sued to recover the initial payment. Held, that she could recover. Haiss v.
Schnukler (1923, N. Y. Spec. T.) 121 Misc. 574,
The vendee had the equitable title under the contract and must bear any loss not
due to the negligence or default of the vendor. Sewell v. Underhill (i9o) 197
N. Y. 168, 90 N. E. 430; Marion v. Wolcott (I9O4, Ch.) 68 N. J. Eq. 20, 59 Atl.
242; I Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence ( 4th ed. 1918) sec. 368; contra: Good v.
Jarrard (1912) 93 S. C. 229, .76 S. E. 698. As the Emergency Rent Law was
already in force and as a clau e in the contract contemplated a possible tenancy,
it seems that the vendee in the 'instant case fairly assumed the risk that the tenant
would avail himself of the statute. See NoTEs (1923) 23 COL. L. Rv. 66o.
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-ADMISSMILITY OF BAPTISMAL RECORD TO EVmENCE DATE
OF BIRTH.-In a personal injury suit it was necessary to prove the plaintiff to be
less than sixteen years old to take the case out of the provisions of the Workman's
Compensation Act. The plaintiff introduced a church baptismal record setting
[564]
CURRENT DECISIONS
forth the date of plaintiff's birth. Defendant objected on the ground that the
record was competent to prove only the fact and date of the baptism and not the
date of birth three years earlier. Held, that the baptismal record was admissible
to prove the age. Dillon v. Heller & Bros. (1923, N. J. Sup. C.) 122 Atl. 595.
The orthodox rule is that a record is competent to prove only the fact and date
of the event recorded. Larnbrecht v. Holsaple (1916) 164 Wis. 465, I6o N. W.
168. The reasoning is that if the recorder was testifying in person, his declara-
tions as to the age would be merely hearsay. But the record may prove age
indirectly by showing that the party was alive at the date of baptism. Collins v.
Insurance Co. (9o5) 112 Mo. App. 209, 86 S. W. 891. And there is a growing
tendency to allow the record as proof of all facts customarily set out in it.
Drosdowski v. Chosen Friends (1897) 114 Mich. 178, 72 N. W. 169. This is so
by statute in some jurisdictions. In re Evd's Estate (I918) 93 Conn. 38, 104 Atl.
238.
INTERNATIONAL LAw-ALEN ENEMIES-WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-STATUTE
OF LlmUTATiNs.-In an action under a Workmen's Compensation Act for the death
of the plaintiff's husband in igiS, the defendant pleaded the statute of limitations.
The deceased, at the time of his death was an Austrian subject, and the plaintiff
was a resident of that part of Austria-Hungary which in 1918 became Jugoslavia,
which country was recognized by the United States in 1919. Held, that while
war suspends the statute of limitations as to alien enemies, after the recognition
of Jugoslavia plaintiff was an alien friend, and the statute ran therefore against
her claim. Kolundjija v. Hanna Ore Mining Co. (1923, Minn.) 193 N. W. 163.
Collective changes of citizenship by cession, annexation or conquest are well
recognized in international law. For a collection of cases and precedents, see 3
Moore, Digest of International Law (i9o6) sec. 379; see also Gout v. Cilnitian
[1922, P. C.] I A. C. 1o5. The change of citizenship in the case of Jugoslavia
was recognized in the Act of June 5, 1920 (41 Stat. at L. 977, 979) providing for
the return to such persons of property held by the Alien Property Custodian. In
those courts which hold that the statute of limitations under Workmen's Compen-
sation Acts is part of the right and not of the remedy, the result reached would
be the same, though on the theory that war does not suspend the statute. Roguij v.
Alaska Gastineau Mining Co. (1923, C. C. A. 9th) 288 Fed. 549; cf. (1920) 29
YALE LAW JoURNAL, 572.
PUBLIC SERvicE LAw--PRILEGE To DISCONTINUE SERvIcE.-The defendant
discontinued operation of its street railway because of a strike by its employees.
The public utilities commission ordered the defendant to resume operation, but
was disobeyed, due to the greatly increased cost of operation. The attorney
general made application for a writ of mandamus and also filed an information for
a quo warranto. He then applied for a mandatory injunction to compel the defen-
dant to resume operation pending the determination of the actions at law. Held,
that a decree for the plaintiff be affirmed. MI:cCran, Attorney General, v. Public
Service Ry. Co. (1923, N. J. CI.) 122 Atd. 205.
A public service corporation may abandon its entire service when operations are
carried on at a loss, but cannot discontinue service without forfeiting its franchise.
Brooks-Scanlon Co. v. Railroad Commission (1919) 251 U. S. 396, 40 Sup. Ct. 183;
North Carolina Public Service Co. 'v. Southern Power Co. (1920) I8o N. C. 335,
104 S. E. 872. See COMMENTS (1922) 32 YA.LE LAW JOURNAL, 75; (1921) 6
MINN. L. REV. 81; (I921) 9 CALIF. L. REV. 435; see (i92) 35 HARv. L. REv.
623; NOTES (1924) 37 ibid. 368.
